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Introduction 
 
 
The Politics of Protest in Tunisia 
Instrument in Parties’ Competition vs. Tool for Participation 
Amel Boubekeur 
The compromise that was reached between the Tunisian Islamists of Ennahda and old 
regime players in the fall of 2013 made it possible to adopt a new constitution in early 
2014, hold elections by the end of that year, and form a national unity government by 
February 2015. It also ended a period of intense confrontation in the streets, which had 
threatened to plunge the country into chaos and civil strife. Yet, protests are liable to 
rebound, as the parties that have formed the government lack a common vision that 
could reconcile their mutually hostile grassroots. They have also failed to stem demon-
strations for social justice and equitable development in the country’s deprived regions. 
Sustainable stabilization will require that political parties cease to perceive bottom-up 
mobilization as a tool they can deploy against adversaries, or as a security threat that 
needs to be contained. Rather, they should recognize its potential to broaden citizens’ 
participation and be a corrective that can lead to more effective governance. 
 
According to official proclamations and 
the perception of many outside observers, 
the parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions held between October and December 
2014 marked the successful conclusion of 
the democratic transition in Tunisia. Yet, 
the apparent stabilization of the political 
order came after – and to a significant ex-
tent as a result of – an extended and turbu-
lent period of protests and counter-protests 
that shaped the post-revolutionary balance 
of power. Between 2011 and 2013, street 
politics, which occasionally turned violent, 
competed with – and eventually dominated 
– the formal institutional process. On the 
one hand, these protests were a crucial cata-
lyst that led supporters and opponents of 
the Ben Ali regime to form a united oppo-
sition front against the Islamist Ennahda 
party, which had emerged as the dominant 
political player through the 2011 elections. 
On the other, they prompted Ennahda and 
the main opposition force, Nidaa Tounes, 
to agree on a power-sharing deal that sus-
pended their competition and toned down 
political polarization, allowing for the 
management of the transformation process 
in a de-politicized, technocratic fashion. 
2011–2012:  
Competitive Street Mobilization 
After the fall of President Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali in January 2011, Ennahda’s fol-
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lowers took to the street together with the 
political left, the Tunisian General Labor 
Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Tra-
vail, UGTT), and young people from the 
interior regions to prevent the regime party, 
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocra-
tique (RCD), from reclaiming power. Yet, 
competition over revolutionary legitimacy 
and access to state institutions and resources 
soon drove them apart. The October 2011 
victory of Ennahda in the elections to the 
National Constituent Assembly (NCA) led to 
protests against the Islamist party and the 
coalition it formed with two small, soon to 
be marginalized, secular parties (Ettakatol 
and the Congress for the Republic), com-
monly known as the Troika government. 
Anti-Troika protests were organized by 
leftists, intellectuals, the unions, and civil 
society activists, but also by supporters of 
the former regime. Supportive coverage by 
media linked to business allies of Ben Ali 
further boosted these demonstrations. They 
campaigned against what they referred to 
as “a total takeover” of state institutions by 
the Ennahda through the Troika. Some of 
the protesters also aimed at challenging the 
legitimacy that the Islamists had won at 
the polls by means of “popular legitimacy” 
in the streets. This included some civil soci-
ety organizations – such as the General 
Union of Tunisian Students (Union générale 
des étudiants tunisiens, UGET), Doustourna 
(Our Constitution), and the Tunisian Asso-
ciation of Democratic Women – which 
attempted to use street politics to compen-
sate for the electoral defeat of leftist and 
centrist parties, to which they were his-
torically connected. 
More generally, civil society saw street 
protests as a way to work against the mo-
nopoly of political parties over the tran-
sition process. Among their successful 
mobilizations were the sit-in outside the 
NCA in December 2011 (known as the Bardo 
protest, named for the neighborhood in 
which the NCA was situated), which ob-
tained more transparency for the proceed-
ings of the assembly, as well as the August 
2012 demonstrations that helped scuttle a 
constitutional clause advocated by Ennahda 
by which the role of women would have 
been defined as “complementary” rather 
than equal to men. In these instances, pro-
tests served as an important corrective of 
the formal political process. 
The Islamist party quickly responded in 
kind. While officially denying any direct 
involvement, it openly encouraged its sup-
porters to organize counter-demonstra-
tions. Thus, participants at the 2011 Bardo 
protest faced a heterogeneous crowd of 
Ennahda sympathizers and football fans, 
who denied the “losers” of the elections 
the right to intervene in the transforma-
tion. Throughout the summer of 2012, 
the Ennahda youth conducted a campaign 
under the slogan “Ekbess” (“Stay firm!”), 
urging the leadership to crack down on 
members of the old guard and provide com-
pensation for victims of Ben Ali from the 
Islamist milieu. These street actions in favor 
of “electoral legitimacy” countered the 
claim to “popular legitimacy” advanced by 
the opponents of the Troika by showing 
that Ennahda could mobilize mass support 
as well. 
Salafis and the so-called Leagues for the 
Protection of the Revolution (LPR) were also 
among the driving forces of these counter-
protests. The former represent a hetero-
geneous group of mostly young, often eco-
nomically deprived Tunisians whose primary 
motivation to join the demonstrations was 
support for a revanchist agenda aimed at 
putting an end to the cultural and social 
domination that the pre-revolutionary elite 
had exercised in the name of secularism. 
Participation in a larger movement osten-
sibly oriented toward Islamic values also 
suited the Salafis’ principled rejection of 
partisan politics as un-Islamic, and shielded 
them from police repression, at least to a 
certain degree. Ennahda’s leaders, in turn, 
drew leverage from their activities by im-
pressing on leaders of the former regime 
that they alone had the capacity to control 
these “unruly masses.” 
At that time, both Ennahda and the 
Salafis shared the notion that the revolu-
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tion had ended the era of the authoritarian 
exclusion of Islamists and that it should 
lead to the Islamization of the constitution 
as well as the universities, among other 
institutions. From mid-2011 to mid-2012, 
they rejected the authority of elected leftist 
teachers’ and students’ unions, organized 
sit-ins for the right of female students to 
attend university exams with full-face 
veil, and pushed for the establishment of 
mosques on campuses. They also achieved 
the replacement of state-appointed Imams 
in many mosques with preachers known 
for Islamist leanings and disrupted media 
and cultural events they judged ostensibly 
“provocative” to Islam, such as an art 
exhibition held at the Palais Abdellia in 
the bourgeois neighborhood of La Marsa 
in June 2012, thus also reclaiming the 
reappropriation of “secularist enclaves.” 
Unlike the Salafis, the LPR maintained 
close coordination with Ennahda. They 
attended protests staged by the party youth 
and vice versa, and some activists were 
members of both. Originally established as 
neighborhood committees to address the 
post-revolutionary security void and close 
to local UGTT chapters, the LPR regrouped 
as political allies of Ennahda after it came 
to power and increasingly engaged in vio-
lent activities. Many expected that the new 
dominant force would reward those who 
were organizing protests on its behalf, once 
it came to the redistribution of economic 
and institutional spoils. On many occa-
sions, the LPR demonstrated by threatening 
mainstream media that criticized Ennahda 
for allegedly biased appointments, and 
by intimidating anti-Islamist intellectuals, 
leftist parties, and later the emerging 
opposition party Nidaa Tounes. They also 
often disrupted anti-government meetings 
and protests, sometimes with violent con-
sequences, such as the clashes that led to 
the death of the regional Nidaa represen-
tative of Tataouine, Lotfi Naguedh, on 18 
October 2012. 
They also cooperated with Salafi imams 
to organize counter-demonstrations against 
general strikes initiated by the UGTT. 
Counter-demonstrations also aimed at 
curtailing the activities of civil society 
groups, which the LPR regarded as com-
petitors for revolutionary legitimacy, such 
as the National Association for the Defense 
of the Martyrs and the Wounded of the 
Tunisian Revolution. 
In addition, Ennahda used its newly 
acquired institutional power to counter 
the pressure in the streets. In early 2012, 
Ennahda minister of the interior, Ali Lara-
yedh, hardened his management of public 
protests. Quoting the state of emergency 
statute, he insisted that demonstrations 
needed his explicit authorization, while 
applicable law only required prior notifi-
cation. Also, clashes that had occurred 
during previous Salafi demonstrations 
served as a pretext to close the highly 
symbolic Avenue Habib Bourguiba for all 
protests. In consequence, violent clashes 
occurred between anti-Troika protesters 
and the police (allegedly backed up by the 
LPR) on Martyrs’ Day, 9 April 2012. Ennahda 
MP Sadok Chourou went as far as describ-
ing protestors as “enemies of God,” who 
should have their “hands and arms cut off.” 
Chourou also suggested a constitutional 
provision awarding a special status to the 
LPR as enforcers of the “objectives of the 
revolution.” Although this fell flat, the 
Leagues acquired an official associational 
status by June 2012, which they henceforth 
exploited to organize pro-Troika street 
action that was authorized by the ministry 
of the interior. 
2012–2013: Rising Confrontation 
and the Emergence of Nidaa Tounes 
By 2012, numerous strikes in public com-
panies and protests throughout the country 
had been damaging investor confidence 
and the tourism industry. This led to an 
erosion in the support that businessmen 
linked to the old regime and international 
donors had initially given to Ennahda in 
exchange for the party’s compliance with 
their liberal economic agendas. Over the 
summer and fall, those economic difficul-
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ties, as well as delays in writing the con-
stitution, also multiplied the protests 
against the Troika. 
Supporters of the old regime then ex-
ploited them to change the balance of 
power. In July 2012, the veteran politician 
Beji Caid Essebsi, who had held high offices 
under both Ben Ali and Habib Bourguiba, 
established a new party, Nidaa Tounes (Call 
of Tunisia). The new formation quickly at-
tracted a heterogeneous array of followers 
and allies united by the fear of Ennahda’s 
increasing hegemony. It also attracted 
many of those who had been sidelined by 
the project of the revolutionaries or by 
Ennahda’s government, such as RCD mem-
bers, leftist and secular activists, as well 
as members of the UGTT and the national 
employers’ union (Union Tunisienne de 
l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat, 
UTICA). Through defections from other 
parties, the new force obtained up to 11 
seats in the NCA; without having been 
elected, Nidaa Tounes also formed a broad 
coalition with centrist parties under the 
label “Union for Tunisia.” The leftist alliance 
Popular Front, for its part, initially declined 
the invitation to form an even broader anti-
Islamist coalition. 
At the same time, Ennahda started to 
lose the competition in the streets. The 
assassination of the Popular Front leader, 
Choukri Belaid, on 6 February 2013, was a 
crucial turning point. Since Ennahda had 
previously blamed Belaid for the regional 
and labor protests that were challenging 
the government, the party stood now 
accused of sharing political responsibility 
in the crime. Protests and general strikes 
called by the UGTT to demand the resig-
nation of the Troika government brought 
between 40,000 (according to the interior 
ministry) and 100,000 (according to the 
demonstrators) people to the streets. Ennah-
da’s supporters responded with marches in 
support of “legitimacy” (of the sitting gov-
ernment), for “unity,” and “against violence.” 
Yet, the ruling majority was clearly thrown 
on the defensive. On 25 July 2013, the assas-
sination of Mohamed Brahmi, another pro-
minent figure of the Popular Front, 
prompted the latter to finally join forces 
with the Union for Tunisia and form the 
National Salvation Front (NSF). All relevant 
political parties outside the Troika had now 
joined ranks, and as most of them withdrew 
their representatives from the NCA, the 
constitutional process was on the brink of 
collapse. With the support of the NSF mem-
bers, the UGTT, and UTICA, the Popular 
Front launched the “Rahil” (“Departure”) 
campaign, which involved massive sit-ins 
and demonstrations throughout the coun-
try calling for the dissolution of the NCA. 
By gathering around 150,000 people in 
Tunis on 6 August 2013, the NSF claimed 
that it represented a “national consensus” 
that could override the electoral legitimacy 
of the Ennahda-controlled government. 
Among the participants were activists 
who had been involved in the revolution 
and the defense of its objectives from the 
beginning, but also middle-class Tunisians 
taking to the streets for the first time, 
attracted by Essebsi’s discourse in favor 
of a return to order. Rather than stressing 
secular values, as Nidaa Tounes had done, 
the NSF emphasized the importance of the 
traditional Tunisian Islamic identity in 
order to underline the national consensus 
it claimed to represent, reach out to Ennah-
da’s disappointed voters, contest the Islam-
ist party’s sole claim on religious values, 
and denounce its alleged foreign allegiances, 
in particular to Qatar. Among the protest 
events were collective Iftars (the breaking 
of the fast during the month of Ramadan, 
which coincided with the evening protests), 
and Imams were invited to deliver speeches. 
In this, participants stressed the need to 
put the transition back on track – meaning, 
ending Ennahda’s control over it. 
Political deadlock, the NSF’s massive 
street mobilization, and the pressure from 
an international community fearing an 
“Egyptian scenario” (i.e., a bloody struggle 
between Islamists and old regime members) 
finally drove Ennahda and its opponents 
to a compromise. Instead of continuing the 
confrontation in the streets, they agreed to 
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a power-sharing formula that would sus-
pend the competition for power, and thus 
allow negotiations for a new constitution 
and preparations for presidential elections. 
2013–2014: A Fragile Consensus and 
the End of Street Politics 
It did not take long for differences to arise 
in the broad coalition against Ennahda. 
Whereas Nidaa Tounes used “Rahil” as a 
platform to compensate for its lack of elec-
toral and revolutionary legitimacy, the 
leftist parties saw the protests as an oppor-
tunity to reconnect to the grassroots. Also, 
while the Popular Front pushed for the 
creation of a “Council of National Salva-
tion” that would have superseded the exist-
ing institutions, Nidaa used the leverage of 
the protests to rehabilitate members of the 
former regime. Despite continued protests 
in the interior regions, the UGTT and the 
NSF ended their demonstrations in Decem-
ber 2013 after Ennahda accepted to join the 
so-called Quartet’s (UGTT, UTICA, the Bar 
Association, and the Tunisian League of 
Human Rights) initiative of a national dia-
logue with Nidaa Tounes, and following 
their subsequent agreement on a caretaker 
government of technocrats that would 
govern until elections, to be held in 2014. 
This consensus effectively marginalized 
the agenda of the Popular Front and leftist 
civil society organizations, which had been 
the most active in organizing the protests 
on the ground. The UGTT earned national 
and international recognition for its medi-
ating role, but ended up in an awkward 
position when the government it helped 
to install pursued policies that negatively 
affected its members, such as reductions 
in public employment levels. 
In the end, the 2014 technocratic gov-
ernment as well as the 2015 national unity 
government both implied ending street 
mobilization and contentious action. This 
development put significant strain on the 
alliance as well as on their respective grass-
roots. On Nidaa’s side, some of the dissenters 
who had carried the anti-Ennahda protests 
were elected to parliament in the 2014 
polls, and thus have pursued their oppo-
sition to any cooperation with the Islamists 
within the political institutions. Leftist and 
civil society activists attempting to con-
tinue demonstrations, on the other hand, 
have often been treated harshly by the 
security services. 
Ennahda likewise worked to chase its 
supporters off the streets. Salafis were the 
first victims of its turnaround. Strictly 
speaking, a first rupture had already oc-
curred in March 2012, when Ennahda had 
accepted to drop any direct reference to 
Islamic Sharia from the constitution. In 
2011 and early 2012, the party still con-
sidered Salafis to be a pliant reservoir of 
protesters that could be moved at will. 
Their stance started to change when the 
Salafis refused to convert themselves into a 
legal political party and instead intensified 
their independent protests. When four 
Salafis were apprehended for the murder 
of Belaid in late February 2013, the political 
cost of being associated with these groups 
became unaffordable. In May 2013, when 
Ennahda had already started negotiations 
with the opposition, minister of the interior 
Larayedh refused to authorize a Salafi con-
gress in Kairouan – a follow-up to an event 
that he had allowed a year before – causing 
violent riots in deprived Tunis neighbor-
hoods. Throughout 2013 and 2014, hunger 
strikes and protests by Salafis against police 
harassment under terrorism charges were 
regularly and often violently dispersed. 
Ennahda’s compromises with Nidaa also 
drew resistance from the LPR. Throughout 
2013, the Leagues mobilized to pressure 
Ennahda into insisting on a constitutional 
clause that would have excluded former 
RCD members from political office. The 
party was deeply divided over the issue, 
until its leader, Rashid al-Ghannouchi, 
finally abandoned the proposal in August 
2013. The LPR were equally dissatisfied 
when the party agreed to enter the national 
dialogue with Nidaa Tounes in October 
2013, as the dissolution of the LPR was one 
of the conditions put forward by the Quar-
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tet’s platform. It finally went into effect on 
26 May 2014. At the same time, elements of 
the LPR on the one side and ex-RCD militias 
posing as Nidaa supporters on the other 
have remained active and attempted to dis-
rupt the election campaigns of the oppos-
ing sides in the fall of 2014. 
Protests Against Political and 
Economic Marginalization 
Although the rival mobilizations for and 
against Ennahda monopolized most atten-
tion, young unemployed people, workers 
affiliated to local UGTT chapters, and civil 
society activists in the marginalized regions 
of Tunisia continued to protest for social 
justice after Ben Ali’s fall. Yet, they were 
increasingly denigrated as a threat to the 
consolidation of post-revolutionary politics 
and the economy. The leaders of the Islam-
ist and the technocrat government alike 
all condemned labor action as being engi-
neered by their political opponents, allud-
ing first to the left and former RCD mem-
bers, and after late 2013 to pro-Islamist 
actors. 
These local protests reveal the potential 
for conflict that has been created by an 
elite-driven interpretation of the revolu-
tion’s objectives. Tunisia’s mainstream 
media, external actors, and national policy-
makers all share the view that the success 
of the transformation lies in the adoption 
of a constitution and the organization of 
pluralist elections. Negotiations on the 
elite level aim at subduing the unruly post-
revolutionary polity, reasserting central 
control, and complying with the conditions 
attached to international aid, such as the 
privatization of natural resources. In con-
trast, protesters from Tunisia’s interior 
regions believe that the revolution was 
about ending political and economic ex-
clusion and about decentralizing power. 
Through their mobilizations, they continue 
to criticize favoritism and police violence 
and demand re-distributional justice. Push-
ing for the exclusion of those perceived as 
corrupt supporters of the old regime has 
also motivated numerous protests in the 
regions. During the 2010/2011 uprising and 
its immediate aftermath, protests led by 
revolutionary youth and their families drove 
RCD governors, police officers, and even 
managers of public companies out of many 
towns. 
In response to state violence that oc-
curred during the revolution (around 1,500 
arrested, 700 injured, and 300 dead), victims’ 
families and supporters formed associa-
tions that conducted demonstrations, sit-
ins, and hunger strikes – first for the release 
of the arrested, then for compensation and 
medical care for the victims, and the pros-
ecution of those responsible. They were 
joined by former political prisoners and 
members of the UGET and the Union of 
Unemployed Graduates (Union des diplômés 
chômeurs, UDC) – many of whom had been 
banned from employment for political 
reasons under the Ben Ali regime and who 
now demand rehabilitation and profession-
al reintegration. 
However, these protesters faced signifi-
cant obstacles that prevented them from 
obtaining broad support. Although dem-
onstrations for or against the Troika could 
count on support from powerful political 
actors and the media, unaffiliated groups 
had few allies. After leading the revolution 
and bringing down the two first post-Ben 
Ali cabinets, these groups that had been 
demonstrating in the capital were quickly 
repressed by Essebsi’s interim government, 
installed in March 2011, and asked by the 
rest of the opposition to return to their 
regions. 
What is more, many of those protests in 
favor of the enforcement of the revolution’s 
objectives have remained technically illegal. 
An amnesty law, finally passed by the NCA 
on 2 June 2014, only pardons illegal acts 
committed during demonstrations that 
happened during the period between 17 
December 2010 and 28 February 2011. 
This left the initiators of all protests that 
occurred during the rest of the transition 
period exposed to prosecution and gave 
the authorities ample leverage to intimi-
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date anyone who refused to comply with 
the post-2013 consensus on ending street 
politics. In 2014, protest leaders from 
regions such as Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid 
were selectively indicted for alleged gang 
formation, defamation of former RCD mem-
bers, non-authorized sit-ins, and violence 
against police stations. Young human 
rights and community activists, bloggers, 
and rappers have also complained about 
police harassment and have demonstrated 
against ongoing torture, suspecting a con-
certed campaign to silence them in prepa-
ration of a return to repressive rule. 
With the multiplication of terrorist 
attacks near or in the marginalized regions 
in 2013 and 2014, public opinion and 
political parties increasingly converged 
on the need to close ranks and reinforce 
security. This played into the hands of the 
Tunisian police union’s lobbying for the re-
habilitation of policemen who supposedly 
“only applied the law” when they repressed 
and killed young revolutionaries. Indeed, 
several former high-ranking security offi-
cials convicted of involvement in regime 
abuses had their prison sentences reduced 
from 20 to 3 years in April 2014. Since that 
was precisely the time they had already 
served, the ruling allowed them to walk 
free. Subsequent hunger strikes and demon-
strations by families of the victims and 
human rights activists remained without 
effect and received little media attention. 
Economic marginalization has further 
fueled protests in the regions. The UDC and 
local independent groups defending the 
rights of the unemployed and precarious 
workers have continued to call for a revo-
lution by the poor. Their demonstrations 
especially target the economic and devel-
opment policies of national representatives 
that they consider to be negligent, corrupt, 
and regionalist, that is, biased toward the 
more developed urban and coastal regions. 
After the departure of Ben Ali, many sit-ins 
were organized against local governors 
and governors nominated by Ennahda. 
The premises of the party were torched in 
several cities in 2012 and 2013, as protest-
ers accused its representatives of favoritism 
in the distribution of public sector jobs. Pro-
testors from the regions joined the peaceful 
marches against the Troika government in 
the summer of 2013 but remained critical 
of the persistence of clientelist networks 
under the technocrat government that fol-
lowed. They have also rejected the succes-
sive governments’ calls for a “social truce,” 
and continued mobilizing against austerity 
and tax policies. Protests often end with tax 
offices and banks being ransacked. 
Wildcat strikes that force the temporary 
closure of public administrations and com-
panies and private businesses have continued 
to erupt. Strikers and sit-inners primarily 
denounce working conditions, youth unem-
ployment, and favoritism in public recruit-
ment. Protesters block roads, launch hunger 
strikes, and even stage suicide attempts in 
front of public companies to push for better 
development and services for their regions, 
such as public hospitals, supplies of water 
and gas, etc. 
Competition between rival local groups 
over informal or illegal resources – such as 
smuggling of arms, goods, and petrol with 
Algeria and Libya – has also hardened. In 
April 2014, and again in February 2015, 
attempts to enhance state control over Tuni-
sia’s borders triggered violence in the south: 
In 2014 the UGTT office in Ben Guerdane 
was torched when the union declined to 
support the protest. As the unity govern-
ment formed in February 2015 is expected 
to adopt new austerity policies, more socio-
economic protests are likely to occur. 
The consensus between former opposi-
tion parties, old regime representatives, 
and unions to declare the revolution over 
has allowed them to label remaining pro-
tests in the regions as security threats. The 
protesters themselves have lost trust in 
national representatives and do not possess 
any stake in the power bargains negotiated 
in the capital. Hence, demonstrations asking 
for dignity and social justice are slowly over-
shadowed by amorphous groups of protes-
tors that include smugglers and juvenile 
delinquents asking for their share of the 
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spoils. Those may turn out to be much 
more difficult to control than activists 
who are pushing for what they consider 
to be the revolution’s true objectives. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Tunisia’s European partners have seen insti-
tutional achievements as being crucial to 
the country’s political consolidation. They 
should now focus on helping Tunisian 
actors address the challenges that are like-
ly to arise from the fragile compromise 
between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. Street 
protests are set to continue because the 
grassroots of Islamist constituencies still 
feel excluded from mainstream politics. 
There are also no effective channels to feed 
the demands of the interior regions and 
of civil society organizations into central 
decision-making processes. 
Thus, although a firm position against 
militias, rogue security forces, and violent 
groups is required, rather than backing 
attempts to repress protests in the name of 
security – which is liable to create the very 
instability it ostensibly aims to avert – Tuni-
sia’s European partners should encourage 
the new government to transform them 
into a component of a democratic political 
culture. 
To this end, three elements are key: First, 
street protests should be seen as opportuni-
ties to enhance political participation and 
improve governance. In the past years, they 
have often occurred when formal channels, 
such as elections, debates in the NCA, or 
the national dialogue, did not function and 
local governance left much to be desired. 
Protests should be seen as an indicator of 
grievances that need to be addressed and 
lead to the establishment of mechanisms 
such as local consultative structures and 
public hearings, which can reconnect 
citizens and public institutions and work 
against exclusion. Such mechanisms could 
be supported in the frame of the European 
Neighborhood Partnership framework. 
Second, European Union member states 
should complement their bilateral security 
and judicial partnerships with Tunisia with 
policies that support the country in harmo-
nizing its handling of manifestations with 
international standards. Police performance 
has to be governed using clear standards 
and rules of engagement and monitored by 
neutral bodies. Threats of terrorism should 
not be exploited to justify restrictions to 
the freedom of assembly and expression. 
Rather, it is high time to revise authoritari-
an practices, such as military tribunals for 
civilian protesters, and to adapt the law on 
demonstrations to international standards. 
Third, European political parties, unions, 
foundations, and NGOs should support train-
ing and encourage agreements that restore 
crucial trust between citizens and the police. 
In this vein, the results of parliamentary 
inquiries into post-revolutionary violence 
should be made public. European experi-
ences with reconciliation processes after 
violent conflicts should be used to inspire 
reconciliation programs organized in part-
nership with local associations, especially 
in deprived regions and neighborhoods, 
where the memory of violent conflicts is 
still vivid. 
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